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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE 
CORPORATION, a New York 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
S'rATE OF UTAH 
HECTOR MARTINEZ and MANUEL M. 
RIVERA, 
Defendants-Appellants, 
vs. 
GREAT EQUITY LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS; 
STREATOR CHEVROLET COMPANY, 
INC.: AL BARRUTIA; BRENT H. 
JENSEN; and E.C. ROSEBOROUGH, 
Third-Party Defendants-
Respondents. 
Case No. 18072 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff, General Motors Acceptance Corporation, 
(hereinafter "GMAC") commenced an action in replevin against 
Defendants, Hector Martinez and Manuel Rivera after default in 
payments under a conditional sale contract. Defendants brought 
action against Third-Party Defendant Great Equity Life Insurance 
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Company (hereinafter "Great Equity") to compel the insurance 
carrier to make the payments under a disability policy purchased by 
Defendant, Hector Martinez. Great Equity denied the claim due to 
a preexisting condition and corresponding exlusion in the policy. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
At the conclusion of all the evidence, the Court granted a 
directed verdict in favor of GMAC and thereafter, allowed 
attorney's fees of $2,500.00. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent, GMAC, seeks an affirmation of the verdict and of 
the award of attorney's fees. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 12, 1978, Hector Martinez and Manuel M. Rivera, 
Defendants and Appellants contracted with Streator Chevrolet 
Company Incorporated to purchase a 1977 Chevrolet Malibu. See 
Plaintiff's Exhibit "l". At the time of executing the 
conditional sale contract, Hector Martinez also arranged purchase 
of a policy of life and disability insurance through Great Equity 
Life Insurance Company of Chicago to pay off the balance of the 
contract in the event of his subsequent death or disability. See 
Defendant's Exhibit "17", R-480. The sales contract was then 
assigned by Streator to Plaintiff-Respondent, General Motors 
Acceptance Corporation for financing of the vehicle and insurance 
premiums. R-358, 368. 
-2-
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Subsequent to the purchase of the vehicle, the Defendant, 
Hector Martinez, made two payments on the contract, and 
thereafter, according to the evidence, became disabled as a 
consequence of a kidney failure. {R. 456). Hector Martinez then 
made application through Streator Chevrolet and the insurance 
carrier to make the payments because of a suffered disability. 
Upon receipt of the notice of the claimed disability, GMAC 
deferred collection efforts on its contract while the insurance 
carrier, Great Equity Life, conducted an investigation to 
determine whether the disability was within the terms of the 
policy. ( R. 3 7 9 ). 
In July, 1979, GMAC was advised by Great Equity that it was 
denying coverage to Mr. Martinez. See Defendant's Exhibit "23". 
GMAC then notified Mr. Martinez of the denial and sought payment 
from Defendants under the contract. See Defendant's Exhibit 
"15". Upon failure of the payments, GMAC sought to recover 
possession of its collateral. 
GMAC attempted, on two occasions, to obtain summary judgment 
to allow it recover the vehicle but the same was refused forcing 
GMAC to go to tr i al. ( R • 6 8 , 6 9 ; R. 13 9 , 1 4 0 ) • At the con c 1 us ion 
of all the evidence and prior to submission of the matter to the 
jury, Judge Dean Condor ruled in favor of General Motors 
Acceptance Corporation, granting it judgment and allowed the 
issues between Hector Martinez and Great Equity Life to go to the 
jury. (R. 525; R. 532), 
-3-
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Because counsel for appellants persists in trying to suggest 
that GMAC somehow has ties to Streator and Great Equity that make 
GMAC responsible for the nonpayment of the insurance carrier, 
counsel has felt obliged to set forth the policies and procedures 
of GMAC generally and as applied to this contract and as 
supported by the testimony of Plaintiff's agent, Morris Keetch, 
who testified at trial, without contravention. These policies 
are reviewed with Plaintiff's agent, Morris Keetch, at pages 354 
through 380 of the Record. 
Plaintiff, General Motors Acceptance Corporation, as applied 
to this case, is in the bu~iness of purchasing retail installment 
sale contracts from automobile dealers upon sales of motor 
vehicles to customers. Although GMAC negotiates arrangements 
with automobile dealets for acquiring retail installment sale 
contracts, no dealer is under any obligation to utilize the 
services of GMAC. Likewise, GMAC will provide forms and 
advertising literature to the dealer but such forms need not be 
used by the dealer except when the dealer intends to use GMAC for 
financing. 
No dealer, doing business with GMAC, nor any customer of 
any dealer is under any obligation to submit any contract to 
GMAC and the dealer and customer are at liberty to work out any 
financing arrangements agreeable between them. The customer is 
entitled to utilize a bank or any other financing institution 
and the dealer is authorized to recommend or use any source of 
-4-
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financing, including the carrying of the contract on his own, if 
desired. 
GMAC does not require as a prerequisite to accepting a 
contract for financing that a customer arrange for credit life 
or disability insurance. Such arrangement is strictly optional 
with the customer. Also, GMAC does not select the insurance 
carrier for the customer, if insurance is selected, nor does it 
obtain any compensation from the premiums paid, except inci-
dentally by interest charges upon the amount of premium which 
may be financed under the contract. The financing institution, 
in this case GMAC, would be named the beneficiary under the 
contract in the event the life or disability portion of the 
contract should be called into effect. GMAC would then be paid 
its monthly payments during the period. of disability, or in the 
event of loss of life, the balance on the contract. 
Upon receipt of a contract by a dealer for acceptance by 
GMAC, Plaintiff, in its course of business, checks the same for 
sufficiency of information, accuracy of computation, and 
compliance with local law. At the presentation of the contract 
to GMAC, GMAC reserves the right to accept or reject the same 
and has no obligation to assume the contract forwarded by the 
dealer. 
At no time does GMAC become involved in the negotiations 
of the price or other arrangements on the contract nor does it 
dictate the terms thereof to the dealer or customer. The dealer 
-5-
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and customer are left free to arrange price and other benefits 
under the contract. GMAC has neither personal contact with the 
customer nor an opportunity to communicate with the customer 
and must necessarily rely upon the information forwarded at the 
time of the proposed assignment of the contract by the auto-
mobile dealer. Specifically, in the instant case, GMAC did not 
deal with the Defendants, either personally, directly, or 
indirectly. 
When Defendants arranged for the purchase of the 
automobile in question, a 1977 Chevrolet Malibu Classic, their 
dealings were strictly with Streator Chevrolet. (R. 476-480). 
The election of Defendant Hector Martinez to acquire a 
disability insurance contract, was a determination which he was 
entirely free to accept or reject. (R. 367, 368). 
Upon receipt of the contract, GMAC approved the same for 
financing and forwarded the requisite balance to the dealer 
including funds to finance the insurance premium for disability 
insurance. However, GMAC is in no way affiliated with Great 
Equity Life. (R. 357). This matter was left between the selling 
dealer and the customer. 
At the conclusion of Plaintiff's case, Plaintiff's counsel 
requested leave of Court to give evidence relative to attorneys 
fees following a final decision of the merits by the Court or 
jury, it being the position of counsel for Plaintiff that the 
attorneys fees were a matter to be determined by the Court and 
-6-
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not the jury. ( R. 336; 34 4 ). Counsel for Defendants objected 
thereto. (R. 342). 
After the decision of the jury, Counsel for Plaintiff made 
a motion for entry of judgment and for a determination of 
attorneys fees. (R. 336). This matter was scheduled for hearing 
but was continued at the request of Counsel for Defendants to the 
2nd of December, 1981. (R. 338). On December 2nd, Counsel for 
Plaintiff appeared at the hearing, after having previously 
submitted an affidavit for attorneys fees and was prepared, if 
necessary, to give testimony at that time. Counsel for 
Defendants did not appear at the. hearing and after reviewing the 
matter, Judge Condor executed judgment in favor of the Plaintiff 
and, based on the affidavit supplied, (R. 340) awarded an 
attorneys fee of $2,500.00. (R. 539, 540). 
The only issues raised by Defendants which appear to 
challenge the judgment rendered in favor of GMAC are parts four 
and six of Defendants' Brief. Therefore, Plaintiff responds 
only to these issues, and to the facts as construed by 
Defendants' Counsel. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WHETHER A PURCHASER OF A MOTOR VEHICLE UNDER A CONDITIONAL 
SALE CONTRACT, WHICH PROVIDES FOR THE FINANCING OF A PREMIUM OF 
A DISABILITY INSURANCE POLICY BY THE FINANCING INSTITUTION IS 
ENTITLED TO WITHHOLD PAYMENTS ON THE CONTRACT TO THE FINANCING 
INSTITUTION WHEN THE DISABILITY CARRIER DISPUTES THE RIGHT OF 
THE DISABLED PURCHASER TO CLAIM THE BENEFITS OF THE POLICY. 
-7-
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Counsel for Defendants suggests that GMAC, by virtue of 
its accepting the contract of sale between Defendants and 
Streator Chevrolet for financing, caused GMAC to stand in the 
shoes of Great Equity Life. Therefore, it is alleged that GMAC 
was obligated to be paid by Great Equity Life or forfeit pay-
ments due under the contract. This theory of Counsel for 
Defendants is apparently predicated upon the fact that GMAC 
stood to benefit both under the sales contract and under the 
policy issued by Great Equity Life. However, no authority to 
support such a proposition is cited by Counsel. 
It is clear from the evidence and as found by the lower 
Court, that GMAC received by assignment a conditional sale 
contract from Streator Chevrolet, which it accepted for finan-
cing. (R. 524). Also it is undisputed that at the receipt of 
the contract by GMAC the contract, on its face, indicated that 
Defendant Hector Martinez requested disability insurance and 
that the same was to be financed out of the proceeds to be paid 
by GMAC to Streator Chevrolet. See Plaintiff's Exhibit "l": 
(R. 369). Also, the contract is specifically clear that Defendants, 
not Great Equity Life, were to pay the contract. 
The evidence did adduce that the purpose of the disability 
policy was to pay the obligation of Defendant, if Hector 
Martinez became disabled within the stipulated provisions of the 
insurance contract, and that Great Equity Life recognized the 
obligation to pay GMAC, the creditor. See Defendant's Exhibit 
-8-
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"22". However, this was not a part of the sales contract. 
Under the law of this state and established rules of 
contract, all provisions of an agreement should be considered 
and given effect [Minshew v. Chevron Oil Company, 575 P.2d 
( 
192 (Utah 1978)], and when the language is clear, it must 
be enforced according to its terms. Wingets v. Bitters, 
28 Utah 2d 231, 500 P. 2d 1007 (1972). A court will not 
rewrite the terms of an unambiguous contract [Provo City Cory. 
v. Nielson Sco~t Company, Inc., 603 P.2d 803 (Utah 1979)], 
and a contract does not become ambiguous (so as to cause a court 
to rewrite it) by the fact that the parties may urge diverse 
interpretations. Jones v. Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 1980). 
Also, when the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, the 
contract is conclusive. Rushing v. Lov~lace-Bataan Health 
Program, 598 P.2d 211 (New Mex. 1979). 
As concerns a question of rights of a party, not a party 
to a contract, but for whose benefit the contract was made, 
it is well settled, that the rights of the third person to sue 
under the contract are dependent upon the terms of the agreement 
and are no greater than those of the promisee. Continental Bank 
and Trust Company v. Stewart
1
4 Utah 2d 228, 291 P. 2d 890, 894 
(1955). 
A reading of the contract of sale in the instant case 
clearly establishes the obligation of Defendants to pay on the 
contract. Nowhere does the agreement specify the right of the 
-9-
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Defendant to withhold payment if the buyer became disabled 
or, upon becoming disabled, if the insurance carrier refused to 
pay. Further, the contract does not give the right to the buyer 
to withhold payment if he disagrees with the refusal of the 
insurance carrier to pay under its contract. 
The contract of insurance was between Hector Martinez and 
Great Equity Life Insurance Company. GMAC, although a 
beneficiary, was not a party to the contract. Consequently, 
when a dispute arose as to whether Hector Martinez was within 
the coverage provisions of the policy, that dispute was for him 
to resolve, and if possible, to force the insurance carrier to 
perform its contract. The fact GMAC may have had an interest 
and claim as a third party beneficiary did not suddenly 
terminate the sales agreement. The rights of GMAC as a third 
party beneficiary would be no greater than those of Hector 
Martinez. Continantal BaE~ & Trus~ Co. v. Stewart, supra. 
However, even assuming the right of GMAC to sue Great Equity 
Life as a third party beneficiary, GMAC could do nothing more 
than seek to compel Great Equity Life to pay the payments; 
however, it was not obligated to do so. 
To suggest that GMAC, by financing the premium for a 
disability policy on behalf of Hector Martinez, forfeited its 
rights to look to the Defendant for payment while Hector 
Martinez pursued his claim against Great Equity Life, would 
require a rewriting of a clear and unequivocal contract, which 
-10-
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the courts will not do. Provo City Cor_p. v. Nielson Scott 
Company, Inc., supra. To uphold the position sought by 
Defendants would afford every person who causes injury to 
another for which he carries insurance, to prevent judgment 
being entered against himself merely because a dispute arises 
between himself and his insurance carrier as to whether the incident 
was covered under the policy. 
The proper remedy for Defendants would have been to make 
the payments under the agreement with GMAC and prosecute against 
Great Equity Life to recover such sums as Defendants could 
establish the carrier was liable to pay. See Scott v. 
M~tropolita~ Life, 398 P.2d 822 (Okl. 1964). 
By failing to perform under the sales contract, Defendants 
breached the agreement entitling Plaintiff to judgment. The 
lower Court properly granted judgment in favor of the Plaintiff 
and the decision of the lower Court should be upheld. 
POINT II 
WHETHER A PARTY TO A CONTRACT AUTHORIZING RECOVERY OF 
ATTORNEYS FEES WAIVES THE RIGHT TO OBTAIN SUCH FEES BY FAILING 
TO PRESENT EVIDENCE THEREOF BEFORE THE JURY BUT THEREAFTER 
PRESENTS EVIDENCE TO THE COURT. 
Under our law, attorneys fees are awardable only if 
expressly provided by contract or statute and then only if there 
is produced to the Court evidence of the necessity and 
reasonableness of the fee awarded. Walker v. ?andwick, 548 P.2d 
1273 (Utah 1976). There is no question that the sales contract 
-11-
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in issue did provide for attorneys fees if an attorney was 
utilized to enforce collection of the contract. See Plaintiff's 
Exhibit "l", reverse side, Paragraph 4. 
The establishment of a reasonable attorneys fee in a 
contested matter is not controlled by any set formula [Wallace 
v. Build, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 401, 402 P.2d 699 {1965)] and the 
same may be established by stipulation, an unrebutted affidavit 
or evidence given as to the value thereof. Freed Finance Company 
v. Stoker Motor Company, 537 P.2d 1039 (Utah 1975). Regardless 
of how the fee is proved, it is clear that the fee must be 
supported by evidence in the record. See Richards v. Hodson, 26 
Utah 2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044 (1971). 
Counsel for Defendants suggests two propositions as to why 
attorneys fees should not be granted: first, he indicates there 
is no evidence in the record, and second, that no evidence was 
presented to the jury. 
As to the first proposition, the record evidences that 
after the Court· directed a verdict in favor of Plaintiff, 
Counsel sought for a hearing to establish his claim for 
attorneys fees and for entry of judgment based upon the of 
Court's granting of Plaintiff's motion for directed verdict at 
trial. (R. 336~ The motion was initially scheduled for November 
23, 1981, and was rescheduled to be heard on December 2, 1981, 
at the request of Counsel for Defendants (R. 338) who, after 
receiving notice of the hearing and a copy of Counsel's 
-12-
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Affidavit for attorneys fees, neither attended the hearing nor 
opposed the reasonableness of the fees in the Affidavit. 
(R. 540). Counsel did forward his motion requesting a denial of 
the attorneys fees because of failure to produce evidence before 
the jury but did not challenge the reasonableness of the fees. 
(R. 342). Consequently, the Court properly awarded attorneys fees 
after the trial based on proper evidence, and an unrebutted 
affidavit. (R. 536-538; R. 539); See Fr~ed Finance Company v. 
Stoker Motor Company, sup~. 
The second question· raised is whether failure of Counsel 
to provide testimony before the jury for its consideration 
precludes the subsequent entry of the award. It is true that 
attorneys fees must be proved as other damages, that is, by 
stipulation or evidence, [Cluff v. Culmer, 556 P.2d 498 (Utah 
1976)) but the question is, to whom must the reasonableness of 
the fee be proved? This Court has long held that the judiciary 
has the power to determine what is a reasonable attorneys fee 
when a claim therefor is properly in issue by contract or by 
statute. Thatcher v. Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 568, 207 
P.2d 178 (1949). Further, as stated in Wallace v. Build, Inc., 
402 P.2d 699, 701, (1965): 
What is reasonable depends upon a number of 
factors, the amount in controversy, the extent 
of services rendered and other factors which 
the trial court is in an advantaged position 
to judge. Emphasis added. 
In F.M.A. Financial Corporation v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 
-13-
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2d 80, 404 P.2d 670 (1965), the Court recognized that an 
award of attorneys fees need be supported by some evidence 
to the judge, stating at page 673 of 404 P.2d: 
Because both judges and lawyers have special 
knowledge as to the value of legal services, 
this (proof of fees) is not always required 
to be proved by sworn testimony. It is 
sometimes submitted upon stipulation as to 
the amount; or that the judge may fix it 
on the basis of his own knowledge and 
experience; and/or in connection with refer-
ence to a bar approved schedule. Emphasis 
added~ matter in parenthesis and underlining 
by author. 
From the authorities cited, it is evident that the 
reasonableness of an attorneys fee is a matter for court 
determination. The reasonableness of this position affords the 
trial judge, himself an experienced lawyer, the opportunity of 
determining what is reasonable in a given case. Laymen jurors, 
unfamiliar with the demands and efforts of counsel, would not 
be in a position to identify what is reasonable in a given case. 
Producing such evidence would be a waste of the jurors' time. 
Further, if evidence concerning reasonableness of attorneys fees 
is produced before the jury, this puts counsel in the awkward 
situation not only of having to argue the cause of his client on 
its merits but to justify before the jury his charges for his 
services, thus requiring counsel to, "have a fool for a client". 
A reading of the case of Gardner v. Christiansen, 622 P.2d 
782 (Utah 1980), might cause one to conclude that an award of 
attorneys fees must be based upon evidence produced in the case 
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Correction to Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant 
General Motors Acceptance Corporation 
GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE 
CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HECTOR MARTINEZ and 
MANUEL M. RIVERA, 
Defendants, 
vs. 
GREAT EQUITr LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, et. al. 
CASE NO. 18072 
Correction to Page 15 of Brief of General Motors Acceptance Corpor-
ation: The last sentence of the carry-over paragraph starting at 
line 10 and e~ding at line 14 should read: 
In fact, in Provo City Corp. v. Cropper, 
28 Utah 2d 1, 497 P2d 629 ( 1972) ,. the Supreme Court remanded 
the case to the District Court for the purpose of taking 
evidence on the issue of attorney's fees, when such evidence 
was omitted in the proceedings below. 
Respectfully submitted, 
v-: Barney --
( tor y for Plainti -Appellant, 
eral Motors Acceptance 
Corporation. 
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in chief and not after. Here, Counsel, after resting his case 
and prior to closing argument, moved to reopen, in a hearing 
before the judge, to produce evidence of attorneys fees, which 
was denied by the Court. On appeal, the Court although 
recognizing that a motion to reopen for additional evidence is 
within the sound discretion of the Court, nevertheless ruled the 
trial Court abused its discretion in failing to allow counsel to 
present the requested evidence. The case does not stand for the 
position that evidence of attorney's fees must be made prior to 
resting one's case. In fact, in Provo City Corp. v. Cropper, 
28 Utah 2d 1, 497 P.2d 629 (1972), the Supreme Court remanded 
the case to the District Court for the purpose of taking 
evidence on the issue of attorney's fees, when such evidence was 
omitted at trial. 
Even assuming that the jury was the proper forum to have 
heard the evidence relative to attorneys fees, failure of 
counsel to present evidence to the jury would not be fatal to 
the award rendered by the Court in the instant case. Then, the 
Court directed a verdict for Plaintiff at the close of all the 
evidence, the Court took all issues relating to Plaintiff's case 
from the jury. Therefore, it also had the discretion to receive 
such further evidence in the case as it deemed pertinent. See 
Gardner v. Christiansen, supra. 
In the exercise of its discretion, the lower Court granted 
Counsel for Plaintiff, after notice to Defendants' Counsel, an 
-15-
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opportunity to present its claim for attorneys fees and accepted 
the affidavit as presented. Such discretion in proceeding was 
not prejudicial to the rights of Defendant (See Gardner v. 
Christiansen, supra at 784), especially where the affidavit of 
Plaintiff's Counsel as to the reasonableness of the fees was 
unopposed. See Freed Finance Company v. Stoker Motor Co@pany, 
supra. 
For the reasons above stated, the judgment of the lower 
Court awarding attorneys fees should be upheld. 
POINT III 
CERTAIN ALLEGATIONS OF COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT IN HIS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ARE MISLEADING AND CONFUSING 
Counsel for Plaintiff begs the indulgence of the Court 
to one further point. Because of time limitations on oral 
argument when granted, counsel felt it important to call to the 
Court's attention certain matters that have been stated by 
counsel for Defendant that tend to be misleading and confusing. 
At page 2 of the Statement of Facts of Defendant's 
brief, Defendant alleges: 
The Conditional Sales Contract did provide that 
should Hector Martinez die or become totally 
disabled, the Great Equity Life Insurance Company 
of Chicago, Illinois would pay off the contract 
in its entirety. 
The Conditional Sale Contract in this case made no 
such provision that would have any effect upon Hector Martinez. 
-16-
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' 
The Contract, on its face, had a provision that suggests that 
the Prudential Insurance Company of America, Newark, New Jersey, 
by virtue of group policy #GL360, could issue life and 
disability insurance. However, to accept this particular 
policy, the Buyer was required to sign in the box related to 
this item. Hector Martinez neither signed nor agreed to a 
policy with Prudential, but rather elected a policy provided 
through the agent of Streator Chevrolet with Great Equity Life. 
Consequently, counsel's reference to this portion of the 
Conditional Sale Contract is misleading and has nothing to do 
with the terms and conditions of the disability policy issued by 
Great Equity Life. 
Additionally, at page 9, counsel for Defendant suggests 
that Streator Chevrolet was required to take an age and health 
statement from Mr. Martinez according to the provisions on the 
face of the Contract relating to the Prudential Insurance 
Company information. Again, as previously indicated, this 
provision had no relevance to the contract as this company was 
not utilized. See also Brief of Third-Party Defendants-
Respondents at Pages 17-19. 
At page 27 of counsel's brief, it is suggested that Mre 
Rex Elton was empowered by GMAC to write insurance for Great 
Equity. At no place in the testimony given before the trial Court· 
was there any evidence whatsoever indicating GMAC empowered Mr. 
Elton to do anything, including the writing of insurance. 
-17-
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Specifically, see pages 370, 371 of the Record. 
At page 28, counsel suggests that GMAC undertook to 
interpret the policy of insurance. Again, this is a 
misstatement of the facts. It is acknowledged that a letter was 
forwarded to Mr. Martinez after GMAC received notice from Great 
Equity Life that it was denying coverage based on a preexisting 
condition. Upon sending a letter to Mr. Martinez requesting 
additional payment, the author of the letter, apparently being 
confused about the policy, adopted language from the Prudential 
Insurance Company information contained on the Conditional Sales 
Contract as the basis for the denial. See Defendant's Exhibit 
"15". Although the provision cited was in error, and unrelated 
to this contract as previously explained, the factual position 
was still accurate based upon the representations of Great 
Equity Life, namely that Great Equity Life was denying coverage 
under the policy to Mr. Martinez because of a pre-existing 
condition which the insurance carrier asserted should have been 
known to Mr. Martinez. See Plaintiff's Exhibit "12". GMAC's 
letter, regardless of the reasons for denial by the insurance 
carrier, was to inform Mr. Martinez of his obligation to bring 
his payments current and fulfill his contract. The decision not 
to pay the disability was that of Great Equity Life and not that 
of General Motors Acceptance Corporation. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons as set forth in Plaintiff's Brief, 
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judgment of the lower Court in favor of Plaintiff and against 
Defendants should be upheld and further, the attorneys fees of 
$2,500.00 as established to the satisfaction of the Court should 
be awarded. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JAY V. BARNEY, 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent, 
General Motors Acceptance Corporation 
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